Uzbekistan has been difficult to classify among the thirty-plus economies in transition during the 1990s and has posed a puzzle, because it is a slow reformer but relatively good performer. This paper argues that there is no simple Uzbek model. Uzbekistan's economic reform process has been inconsistent gradualism through three different phases during the 1990s. Economic performance was due to favourable external conditions during the first half of the 1990s and to reasonably good policy-making, although policy errors in late 1996 led to negative effects. Uzbekistan illustrates the importance of policy, but sheds little light on a debate framed in terms of rapid reform versus gradualism.
THE UZBEK MODEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1991-9
Uzbekistan has been one of the most enigmatic of the thirty-plus economies in transition from central planning during the 1990s. The government explicitly avoided the shock therapy advocated by the international financial institutions and also avoided the economic collapse of non-reformers such as Belarus or Turkmenistan. Its economic performance, measured by change in real GDP between 1989 and 1999, was one of the least bad among transition economics and the best of all former Soviet republics. The aim of this paper is to set out the Uzbek model as it has evolved during the 1990s and to analyse connections between policies and performance in Uzbekistan.
In the early 1990s the new government frequently invoked the Chinese model or the South Korean model as its blueprint for gradual reform leading to rapid economic growth. In fact, policies bore little relation to China's strategy of agrarian reform plus opening of the economy followed by a hands-off approach to new enterprises, and even less resemblance to Korea's market economy. One similarity to China, however, has been the commitment to political stability and harsh response to open dissent. Also as in China, the autocratic leader has on critical occasions pushed reforms forward rather than allowing interests resistant to change the opportunity to turn back the clock. The government now refers to the Uzbek model but, apart from not being rapid reform, its content is unclear. On several key occasions, policies appear to have been 1 In China, Deng Xiaoping used his authority to push through the initial reform package in December 1978. In 1981-2 when conservative leaders were fearful of the growth of unregulated township and village enterprises, Deng's camp gave the seal of approval to this development. Again in 1986, after a brief reversal of the reform process, the leadership pushed ahead with major liberalization of foreign investment legislation and in 1992, after a longer hiatus, Deng's symbolic Tour of the South signalled further reforms. On all of these occasions the decision to move forward was taken in Beijing, despite strong opposition, even though the main beneficiaries were specific reform-oriented regions of China.
reactive, rather than part of a consistent strategy -a process characterized by Pomfret and Anderson (1997) as "inconsistent gradualism". Transition to a market economy has been taking place, despite frequent references in the literature to Uzbekistan as a non-reformer. 2 Part of the problem of classifying Uzbekistan on a reform scale is the changing nature of the economy. Initially, to the end of 1993, the government resisted dramatic economic change, although even this period was not one of non-reform. In 1994 economic reforms were accelerated although the government remained cautious and when faced with a serious balance of payments crisis in the second half of 1996 it reacted in an illiberal way, resorting to exchange controls. During the remainder of the decade, the government continued to develop a market economy, but was seriously impeded by the lack of market-determined interest and exchange rates,. Uzbekistan is a slow reformer, but the economy is substantially different at the end of the 1990s from a decade earlier, and the market economy, albeit heavily controlled, is accepted to a greater extent than in reluctant reformers such as Turkmenistan, Belarus or Ukraine.
Initial Conditions, to the End of 1993
The Uzbek Soviet Republic had a troubled history during the second half of the 1980s.
When Mikhail Gorbachev soon after coming to power in 1985 launched his anti-corruption campaign, the Uzbek Republic's leadership was his first target. Although First Secretary Sharof Rashidov's timely death in 1983 excluded him from the purge, thousands of officials 2 The characterization of Uzbekistan as a non-reformer is often derived from the rankings produced by World Bank staff (reported in, for example, de Melo, Denizer and Gelb, 1996) which are the basis for the analysis in the 1996 World Development Report. Wolf (1999, 5) lists Belarus, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as examples of formerly centrally planned economies which "have barely commenced the transition". Spechler (1999) At the time of the last Soviet census in 1989, the Uzbek Republic with twenty million people was the third most populous Soviet republic. It was, however, one of the poorest republics with the second highest poverty rate (Table 1) . Its role in the Soviet division of labour was as a producer of primary products, especially cotton, which dominated the agricultural sector where 40% of the labour force worked, and minerals such as gold and uranium. Politically the Uzbek Republic, like the other Central Asian republics, was conservative, making no reform experiments during the Gorbachev era. Ethnically, the republic was one of the more homogeneous in Central Asia (Akiner, 1983, 277) , with a strong historical and cultural tradition to draw upon. Estimates range up to reports of 58,000 senior officials being replaced (Carlisle, 1995, 79) . 4 Before the Russian conquest in the late nineteenth century, the region's major rulers were the Uzbek emirs and khans of Bukhara, Khiva and Khokand. More important, the Uzbeks claimed the heritage of the great historical cities and rulers such as the Emir Timur (Tamerlaine and 1993, but because of the controlled prices the high 1992/3 inflation rates in Table 2 were among the lowest in the CIS. Enterprise privatization moved slowly, but housing privatization was extensive, partly because of a history (unusual in the USSR) of high levels of home ownership.
During the second half of 1993 the ruble zone disintegrated, due partly to Russian policy choices, but mainly to the design fault of having multiple centres of credit creation (Pomfret, 1996, 118-29) . Uzbekistan appeared to hang on until the last minute and, apart from war-torn Tajikistan, was least prepared to issue a national currency. When Uzbekistan did leave the ruble zone in November 1993, it issued a temporary currency, the som coupon, in which people had little trust.
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Issue of the new national currency was delayed until July 1994.
Emergence of the Uzbek Puzzle, 1994-6
Following a January 1994 Presidential Decree on deepening economic reforms, a period of accelerated change began. Uzbekistan's output performance had not been bad by former Soviet republic standards, with real GDP declining by only 11 % in 1992 and 2 % in 1993 (Table 2 ). This reflected a favourable resource endowment with the major export commodities facing buoyant world prices, and Uzbekistan able to reduce its dependence in imported energy and grain. Uzbekistan, however, continued to suffer from high inflation in 1994 (Table 2) , even as price increases started to moderate elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. Unlike in other gradualists of the time (e.g., Belarus, Turkmenistan and Ukraine), Karimov took the decision to seek macroeconomic stability.
The national currency was introduced in July 1994 and supported by reductions in the growth rate of money supply over the next three years. Price controls were reduced and food rationing abolished, so that open inflation reached a peak in 1994 before declining to below 6 Many citizens had lost out in the July 1993 price reform when Russia unilaterally replaced the Soviet rubles with new Russian ruble banknotes. The November temporary currency issue was confiscatory and the issue of a permanent currency was also expected to be confiscatory. The som coupons were unimpressive in appearance and traded at huge spreads in the black market as almost any other currency was preferred as a store of value.
7 Tarr (1994) estimated a small terms of trade loss to Uzbekistan as a result of switching from Soviet to world prices (see Table 1 ). As a forecast, however, this ignored the possibility of import substitution in oil and wheat. Moreover, unlike Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan whose oil and natural gas exports were sold well below world prices but who could not access world markets due to pipeline routes, Uzbekistan's cotton and gold were fairly easy to transport to global markets.
50% per year in 1997.
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Foreign trade was liberalized and exchange restrictions relaxed. The fiscal deficit was cut from 10. 4% of GDP in 1993 4% of GDP in , to 6.1% in 1994 4% of GDP in , and 4.1% in 1995 (Table   2 ). The tax system was reformed and collection improved, while expenditure on supporting state enterprises and on consumer subsidies was reduced.
During the middle 1990s Uzbekistan emerged as a paradox among CIS countries.
Although cumulative reform was still far behind the Baltics, Russia or even the neighbouring Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan did not experience the deep decline in GDP suffered by all other CIS countries. The cumulative decline in GDP between 1989 and was the lowest among all former Soviet republics. Moreover, Uzbekistan appeared to do relatively well by other measures such as providing a social safety net, alleviating poverty and limiting spending cuts in education and healthcare (Pomfret and Anderson, 1997) . Taube and Zettelmeyer (1998) examine the relative importance of various potential explanations of the "Uzbek Puzzle" and, although measurement errors and favourable initial conditions played a part, their impact was dismissed as small in magnitude; in their study, good policy and public investment were left as the major explanatory factors.
The resource endowment was, however, fundamental to the balance of payments, the public sector budget and investment. Buoyant export earnings from cotton and gold contributed directly to GDP, and were a major source of government revenue. The government kept tight control over both activities and, by a state order system which gave farmers a small fraction of the world price, siphoned resources from agriculture amounting to as much as a twelfth of GDP in1996 (Pomfret, 2000) . An important difference to Russia or Kazakhstan was that the resource rents were not privatized and the government used the revenue to maintain public spending on education and healthcare better than in other CIS countries. The government also acted innovatively and effectively in targeting social assistance through the decentralized mahallah scheme (Coudouel and Marnie, 1999) .
Public investment contributed to GDP, although the attempt to pick winners led to several failures and no obvious successes. Chemical and petrochemical projects in the desert were the biggest flops, but heavily subsidized cotton textile mills may also have been socially wasteful, even if they survived on the basis of distorted prices. The import-substituting nature of these projects illustrates the inward-looking development strategy, even though
Uzbekistan was an open economy by measures such as the export/GDP ratio.
Direct foreign investment into Uzbekistan was modest in total, but included some high profile projects. Apart from Newmont Mining's involvement in gold production, practically all the foreign investment was in import substitutes such as Mercedes Benz in trucks, BAT in cigarettes, Coca Cola in soft drinks and Daewoo in cars. The Daewoo plant, in language familiar from Beijing Jeep in China or Proton Saga in Malaysia in the 1980s, was claimed to be a base for exporting to the region but its two cars and a minibus were sold only in domestic markets during the 1990s. The ubiquitous Daewoo cars, however, were a conspicuous sign of higher living standards during the second half of the 1990s.
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Economic success was accompanied by greater confidence in international relations.
In the early years of independence President Karimov represented himself as a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism, and continued to work with Russia in the Tajikistan conflict 9 The symbolism was also fairly egalitarian, because the little Tico (which cost not much over $1000 at black market exchange rates in 1999) was less opulent and exclusive than the imported Mercedes and BMWs which appeared in Kazakhstan and to a lesser extent in Turkmenistan and the Kyrgyz Republic. Car production in Uzbekistan increased from 82 in 1994 and 300 in 1995 to 25,358 in 1996, 64,908 in 1997 and 54,456 as well as in trying to maintain economic ties from the Soviet era (Bohr, 1998) . After a brief period of economic nationalism tinged with isolationism in late 1993, Karimov started to exert a more positive leadership role in Central Asia during 1994 and then on the world stage.
Relations with the USA warmed considerably as Karimov took opportunities to denounce
Iran and vote with the USA at the United Nations.
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In July 1996 Presidents Clinton and Karimov met in Washington.
Reintroduction of Exchange Controls
Up until the summer of 1996 relations between Uzbekistan and the IMF and World
Bank had been thawing. Uzbekistan was still seen as a slow reformer, near the bottom of most liberalization league tables such as that in the World Bank's 1996 World Development
Report, but there were signs of improvement. In particular, Uzbekistan was committed to liberalizing its foreign exchange regime and establishing convertibility for current account transactions. In Autumn 1996, however, the government reneged on this commitment by reintroducing draconian exchange controls.
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The exchange controls appear to have been a drastic reaction to balance of payments pressures rather than part of a considered strategy. Other elements of Uzbekistan's gradual transition remained essentially unchanged. The exchange controls were strongly criticized by 10 The most notable denunciation of Iran was at the May 1996 ECO summit in Ashgabat, which consequently broke up a day earlier than planned. ECO, the Economic Cooperation Organization, which includes Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, has attempted to bring together all of the non-Arab Islamic countries west of India, but has made little concrete progress (Pomfret, 1999) . In the United Nations the USA found itself on occasion with only two supporting votes, Israel and Uzbekistan. 11 The operation of Uzbekistan's trade and exchange controls since 1996 is described in Rosenberg and de Zeeuw (2000) the IMF, and the Uzbekistan government took pride in asserting its independence by defending the policy.
Economic performance continued to be good by CIS standards as growth became positive in 1996 and accelerated in 1997 and 1998 (Table 2) . Inflation was brought below 50%, although this figure's meaning is in some doubt as over 1400 prices remained controlled in 1999. A mass privatization program was initiated through Public Investment Funds with World Bank aid, but the outcome was meagre, as was that from a case-by-case approach to privatizing thirty large enterprises (only one cement company had been privatized, through foreign purchase, by late 1999). Creation of new small and medium-sized enterprises was also slow, apart from small-scale restaurants and other service activities.
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The most worrying sign was a growing external imbalance, not fully reflected in official statistics, but by 1999 frequently referred to by officials as a crisis. Some negative external developments, such as declining cotton and gold prices and the 1998 Russian crisis, contributed, but the major problem was the import substitution strategy exacerbated by the foreign exchange policy. Production for export was discouraged by policies directing capital to import-competing projects and skewing relative producer prices in favour of such activities. As the gap between the official exchange rate and the black market rate widened from 100% in autumn 1998 to 300% a year later (Table 3) , voluntary exports through official channels became less and less attractive. The external debt increased in 1998 and 1999;
although debt-service ratios were not yet high (Table 2) , the more recent loans had been contracted at 14-15% and earlier IMF loans were coming due for payments in 2000.
In many respects Uzbekistan's experience mimicked that of many newly independent countries of the 1950s and 1960s which enjoyed early economic success, but ran into subsequent problems after pursuing import-substitution policies and ignoring the resource misallocation costs. An overvalued official exchange rate discouraged production of traded goods, while the large black market premium encouraged rent-seeking activities.
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Capital was allocated mainly by government directive, and the outcome was declining productivity of capital; by 1999, official estimates of the incremental capital-output ratio were around 6 and the IMF estimate 8.3, compared to ICORs for well-functioning economies of 3-4.
The viability of the government's strategy depended heavily on its continued implicit tax on cotton and gold.
14 Supply of these commodities was believed to be relatively price inelastic, which is likely to be true in the short-run but less plausible for the longer term.
Apart from the continued misuse of public resources by directing credit and foreign exchange to specific enterprises, the government continued to spend relatively wisely by maintaining health and education spending and extending the social support delivered via the mahallas.
Nevertheless, wise use of GDP is not a substitute for misuse of productive investment in promoting future economic growth.
Is There an Uzbek Model?
The hallmark of Uzbekistan's economic policies since independence has been cautious recognition that economic change is inevitable, and a commitment to gradual reform 13 The controls also encouraged smuggling, both of imports and exports. Farmers close to the border sold their cotton in Kazakhstan to avoid the official marketing channels (Republic of Uzbekistan: Recent Economic Developments, IMF Staff Country Report No.00/36, March 2000, 34). Enforcement of import restrictions and exchange controls diverted resources from productive use. 14 The transfers out of agriculture were large, some 8-10 percent of GNP in the mid-1990s (Pomfret, 2000) . Gold sales are classified information. After 1996, the foreign exchange controls helped to hide the full extent of the difference between world prices and prices set in domestic currency. Rosenberg and de Zeeuw (2000) that the multiple exchange rate regime in the late 1990s transferred about 16% of GDP from exporters to importers, with the Central Bank making a substantial profit as intermediary. 15 Measures of inequality and poverty are even more dubious than the output measures reported in Table 1 , but the evidence points to a relatively good performance by Uzbekistan. In 1989 the Uzbek republic's poverty rate was the second-highest in the USSR, exceeded only by that of the Tajik republic (Table 1) , but by the mid1990s, according to the IMF (World Economic Outlook, May 1998, Table 23 , based on estimates by Branko Milanovic), Uzbekistan's poverty rate was the second-lowest of the eight listed CIS countries. Turkmenistan's economic statistics were notably unreliable in the mid-1990s; non-reform seemed to be associated with stability until a sharp economic collapse in 1997 revealed the weakness of the country's economic performance. 16 In its March 2000 Staff Country Report the IMF discounted policy explanations of Uzbekistan's performance in favour of exogenous initial conditions: "The main explanation for this performance is found in the set of initial conditions characterizing the Uzbek economy at independence. Not only was Uzbekistan comparatively unburdened by over-industrialization, but its endowment with easily marketable primary commodities (i.e., cotton and gold accounted for 60 percent of exports) allowed it to reorient quickly its exports after the collapse of the Soviet Union." (Republic of Uzbekistan: Recent Economic Developments, 5). While plausible for the first half of the 1990s, such emphasis on cotton and gold is difficult to reconcile with Uzbekistan's economic resilience when cotton prices fell by half and gold prices by almost a third between 1995 and 1999. Other
Price reform was cautious too, and this clearly delayed the introduction of market forces. Especially in 1992-4 significant parts of the economy remained characterized by shortages and queues rather than by market-clearing prices. Nevertheless, there were benefits, both in reducing the disruptive effects of sudden price liberalization on supply chains, which explains some of Uzbekistan's relatively shallow output decline during the first half of the 1990s, and in protecting people from sudden drops in real consumption. The benefits are, of course, not sustainable as they will blow out the government budget, but the buying of time has non-trivial welfare benefits.
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By the end of the 1990s the major remaining price controls were on cotton, interest rates and foreign exchange, each of which will impose serious economic costs if maintained long into the twenty-first century.
Caution also characterized the privatization of state assets. Housing and small-scale privatization proceeded apace, but large-scale privatization and agrarian reform have been limited in Uzbekistan. Whether this caution was wise or not depends upon the alternative.
The more successful large-scale privatization programs in central and eastern Europe have been an integral part of the emergence of better functioning market economies. On the other hand, large-scale privatization in Russia and Kazakhstan has done more to exacerbate inequality than to promote economic growth. The former group of countries illustrates the foregone benefits from faster privatization, but Uzbekistan has avoided the potentially serious risks of rapid privatization. Most importantly, in contrast to the latter group of countries, negative shocks in the second half of the 1990s were the crises in 1997 in South Korea (the largest foreign investor in Uzbekistan) and in 1998 in Russia (Uzbekistan's largest trade partner). 17 Uzbekistan's gradual removal of price controls and reduction of consumer subsidies contrasted with Turkmenistan's attempt to buy popularity with a wide range of free or heavily-subsidized basic goods and utilities, which collapsed in 1997. The adverse costs of rapid loss of purchasing power are illustrated by Howell's (1996) harrowing picture from the southern provinces of the Kyrgyz Republic, adjacent to Uzbekistan's Ferghana Valley provinces, of families cutting down fruit trees, slaughtering livestock and keeping children out of school in order to maintain subsistence consumption levels.
Uzbekistan's government has maintained control over natural resource rents, which gave the government an important continuing source of revenue.
Uzbekistan has benefited from good governance in the economic sphere, at least by a narrow definition of economic management and by the generally low standards of the CIS.
The natural resource endowment may have been a positive initial condition, but both cotton and gold prices fell in the mid-1990s and the real test was the use made of the resource rents.
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Although some revenue has been frittered away on wasteful public investment in industrial projects, the government has done fairly well in maintaining health and education expenditure and in providing a social safety net (Pomfret and Anderson, 1997) . Transportation and other public services have continued to function. Loosening of restrictions on small-scale activities and rising disposable income in the late 1990s, at least in urban areas, saw a revival of eating and drinking out, which recalled a past cultural heritage and raised the quality of life for many. Politically the regime is unattractive to liberal observers, but President Karimov appears to enjoy a degree of popularity for maintaining relative stability with social justice.
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Corruption is endemic, but is widely accepted, with 18 A referee suggested that Uzbekistan's favourable initial conditions also included little reliance on machinery industries producing "soft goods" which could not withstand a market test (see also the IMF position quoted in footnote 16). This may be true relative to the western Soviet republics, but within Central Asia Tashkent was the industrial metropolis. The city had its full share of military-related industrial activity, including aircraft production, and Tashkent was also the centre for production of agricultural machinery such as cotton harvesters, for which demand slumped in the 1990s with a switch to more labour-intensive techniques 19 In 1998, when government expenditures amounted to 34.5% of GDP, 45.3% of these expenditures were allocated to health, education and other social policies (Uzbek Economic Trends, January-March 2000, 89-90) . 20 Karimov's popularity and reputation for maintaining stability may have been declining in the late 1990s, but with restricted freedom of expression that is difficult to gauge. After a series of assassinations of public officials in 1997, the government arrested hundreds of people in a 1998 crackdown (Lubin, 1999) . In February 1999 five bombs exploded in downtown Tashkent, killing several people and injuring over a hundred; the biggest one outside the Cabinet of Ministers building was apparently targeted at the President. In August 1999 some 650 Islamist gunmen were caught entering Uzbekistan. Attempts to bomb the insurgents' bases hit the wrong targets, little perception that it has created a nouveau riche class comparable to that of other CIS counties.
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Nevertheless, all is not well. Although reasonably well administered, the general strategy is flawed. By the end of the 1990s Uzbekistan had made the transition to a market economy, but it is an inefficient market economy similar to that of many semi-industrialized countries in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Import substitution is not a viable strategy for promoting long-run growth, and the severe exchange controls imposed since 1996 are a major error with ever more dire consequences. The cautious approach to reform means that there is still time to loosen up the controls and reverse the bias against exports, much as South Korea did in 1964 after a decade of relatively mild import substitution. The longer that change is delayed, however, the more severe the shock of reform will be and the more unpredictable and uncontainable the negative consequences.
In sum, the positive gloss on the Uzbek model is to describe it as a strong government cautiously directing the creation of a market economy while maintaining good governance and social welfare programs. In the uncharted waters of transition, a wait-and-see approach was not a bad option, especially for a new country, previously isolated far from European or Asian role models of market economies and development strategies. Any government of a newly independent country, all of whose economists were Soviet-trained with no experience Such open-endedness prevents any simple assessment of the Uzbek model -proponents can point to satisfactory performance over the country's first decade, while critics can point to future perils if current policies remain unchanged, and both are correct -but it does reflect the reality of both transition and economic development as processes which take time and are rarely smooth.
23 22 One benefit of delay is that by the late 1990s Uzbekistan's economic policymakers had been exposed to market economies and non-Soviet economics by international travel and a variety of training programs. Vested interests resisting reform include the former state farm managers (Pomfret, 2000) and state enterprise managers, but because of the lack of large-scale privatization there is no group comparable to the Russian oligarchs. Given the autocratic nature of the state, the outcome will depend critically on the role of the President and a source of uncertainty is the lack of succession arrangements. 23 Taiwan and South Korea, which began independent economic policymaking in the early 1950s, only achieved widespread recognition of their growth performance in the mid-1970s, and whether they had pursued a replicable development model or were special cases remained contentious into the 1990s. 
